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Abstract
The present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct
investment between a larger and industrially more developed country
and a smaller and industrially less developed country. We demonstrate
how policy competition aﬀects the location decision of the foreign
investor and derive welfare implications. The key variables in our
analysis are intra-regional trade costs, diﬀerences in market size, and
minimum wages.
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1 Introduction
Competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) is pervasive, and on the
rise.1 An increasing number of countries, including transition and developing
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1For an overview of policy competition for foreign direct investment, see UNCTAD
(1996) and Oman (2000).
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countries, actively seek to attract FDI. Competition for FDI is mostly intra-
regional. Typically, an investor makes a short-list of countries or locations
within a country that are considered relevant candidates for the investment.
National or sub-national governments on this list are then invited to compete
for the investment. The incentives oﬀered can be significant, often in excess of
$100 000 per job. Hence, while an investment decision is typically dominated
by economic fundamentals, incentives may aﬀect the location decision when
the potential host countries are fairly similar. 2
For instance, in 1996, General Motors announced its intention of building
a $500 million car plant in Asia.3 Thailand the Philippines fought fiercely
for this investment, both countries oﬀering generous tax incentives. In the
end, Thailand won the contest by matching the oﬀer by the Philippines, and
in addition, giving a 100 per cent tax refund on raw materials for car exports
and a $15 million grant for establishing a General Motors training institute.
Another case involves Canon Inc, which in 2001 intended to establish a
large production facility in East Asia involving the creation of 300 new jobs.
Vietnam oﬀered a substantial incentives package, including a ten-year tax
holiday, and thereby won the competition for the investment over its rival,
the Philippines.
In European transition economies, too, there are signs of incentives com-
petition taking place. Until 1998, the Czech Republic had been reluctant
to oﬀer tax breaks to foreign investors. But after losing out to neighbour-
ing countries in the competition for foreign direct investment, most notably
Hungary and Poland, and countries in Western Europe, the Czech govern-
ment changed its policy position and opened up for a range of investment
incentives.
There are concerns that competition between jurisdictions for FDI may
have undesirable eﬀects. The main concern is that “bidding wars” may arise
that weaken public finances and distort the allocation of investment. Indeed,
UNCTAD (1996) calls for international cooperation to contain excesses of
incentives competition for investment.4
However, competition for FDI is not necessarily negative, for two reasons.
First, competition for FDI may induce countries to upgrade their physical and
2Devereux and Griﬃth (1998) provide evidence that taxation of profits aﬀects multi-
nationals’ investment decision.
3The cases that follow are from Charlton (2003).
4For a discussion of earlier attempts at reaching an international investment agreement,
and in particular OECD’s MAI initiative, see Nunnenkamp and Pant (2003).
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legal infrastructure and implement stable macroeconomic policies. Clearly,
such measures are likely to benefit the economy as a whole. Second, invest-
ment incentives may create foreign direct investment that would otherwise
not take place, or lead to a reallocation of foreign direct investment to regions
or countries where these investments create the largest benefits.
There are a number of reasons why governments may wish to attract
foreign direct investment. Job creation is often emphasised. The access
to cheaper and perhaps higher-quality goods for consumers is also relevant,
although perhaps not at the forefront of the policy debate. Technological
spillovers is yet another eﬀect that has received a lot of attention.
On the other hand, there are certainly sound economic reasons for why
governments may not be so eager to attract foreign direct investment. For-
eign entry may lead to profit shifting away from local firms, and possibly to
the bankruptcy of local firms. Hence, intensified competition in the goods
market is not necessarily in the interest of local governments. Indeed, even
countries that have attracted a lot of foreign investment typically also shield
certain sectors of the economy from foreign entry.
Here, we study the impact of policy competition on the location deci-
sion of MNEs and on the welfare of the host countries. We focus on policy
competition between asymmetric countries. More specifically, one country is
larger than the other. Moreover, the larger country houses a local firm that
competes with the foreign investor in the regional market, whereas there are
no relevant competitors located in the smaller country.
Our paper is related to Fumagalli (2003). She considers a region con-
sisting of two host countries, diﬀerentiated by the technology of their local
firms. Technological spillovers from FDI are stronger in the less advanced
country, because the technological gap between the investing firm and the
local firm is greater there. The two countries are perfectly integrated; there
are no trade costs and prices are equalized. When the MNE invests in the
region, the investment is necessarily located in the more advanced country,
since this limits the extent of spillovers. The firm’s incentive to protect its
technology by locating FDI in a region where spillovers are less pronounced,
is a “protection” argument for the locational choice of FDI. Allowing for in-
vestment subsidies shifts investment to the less advanced country, since this
country has more to gain from the investment in terms of spillovers to the
local industry. Since the investment subsidy in this way directs the invest-
ment to the country with the higher spillovers, aggregate welfare in the two
countries may increase. Hence, prohibiting investment subsidies may be a
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bad idea.
In the paper by Fumagalli, technological spillovers play a crucial role.
However, the presence of technological spillovers, and in particular the as-
sumption that spillovers are increasing in the technology gap, are contro-
versial issues. Empirical evidence suggests that when the technological gap
between investor and host country firms is very large, the absorptive capacity
of the local firms is limited, and hence spillovers small (Aitken and Harri-
son, 1999; Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2002; Girma and Görg, 2002). Our
paper analyses policy competition for FDI without relying on spillovers.
Our paper is also related to Barros and Cabral (2000). In their paper,
there is a small country with an unemployment problem and a large country
without an unemployment problem. There are no local firms and hence no
profit-shifting or technological spillover eﬀects associated with foreign entry.
The larger country is the more attractive location for the foreign firm in
the absence of policy intervention. However, because of the unemployment
problem, the smaller country has more to gain from attracting the invest-
ment. Subsidy competition may therefore induce the investor to locate in the
smaller country. The authors demonstrate that investment subsidies may in-
crease total welfare. In the absence of side payments, there is, however, a
conflict of interest between the two countries in the policy game for FDI.
The present paper also deals with job creation as a motive for attracting
FDI. However, we do not base our argument on the fairly ad hoc assumption
in the paper by Barros and Cabral that the small country has an unemploy-
ment problem and the large country not. In our paper, there are interesting
trade-oﬀs between locating in the larger or smaller market even if the gap
between nominal and shadow wage is the same in both countries. The reason
is that we add a local producer, and hence a competition eﬀect, the strength
of which depends on the location choice of the foreign firm.
Haufler and Wooton (1999) study policy competition for FDI between
two countries of diﬀerent size. In their paper, the investor faces no regional
competition for its product, and it is not able to price discriminate between
the two countries in the region. In equilibrium, the firm always invests in the
larger country. Our paper diﬀers from theirs by analysing regional compe-
tition and price discrimination. Haaland and Wooton (1999) analyse policy
competition for FDI within a general equilibrium framework. The investor
in their model does not aim at supplying local markets. Hence, minimizing
costs is the only concern of the investor when choosing the optimal loca-
tion. Finally, our paper is related to the tax competition literature in public
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finance, such as Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991) and Kanbur and Keen
(1993). The main diﬀerence between the public finance literature on tax
competition and the literature on competition for foreign direct investment,
is that the latter deals with markets of imperfect competition and the former
with perfect competition.
Our model naturally has some limitations. The mechanisms we focus
on are more relevant for market seeking FDI than for other investment mo-
tives. Note, however, that our analysis does not exclude the possibility of the
investor also exporting to countries outside the region. But, implicitly, we
assume that the extra-regional export potential is the same in both countries,
and hence does not aﬀect the choice of location.
Our paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting the model.
Then we apply the model to two diﬀerent scenarios. First, in section 3, we
analyse the situtation where the host countries have no unemployment prob-
lem, so that job-creation is not an argument for subsidizing FDI. Then, in
section 4, we analyse the situtation with unemployment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a region consisting of two countries, A and B. Country A is a larger
economy with a more developed industrial base than B. Demand in country
A is given by
QA = α (1− pA) , (1)
and in B
QB = 1− pB, (2)
where QJ is the quantity demanded in country J , pJ is the market price,
and α > 1 measures the market size of A relative to B. The industrial base is
more developed in A in the sense that prior to the entry of a foreign investor,
there is a single producer in the region, firm a, located in country A.5
A foreign firm, which we shall sometimes refer to as “the multinational”,
wishes to invest in one of the two countries in order to service regional de-
mand. Transaction costs associated with exporting to the region are assumed
5Allowing an extra firm in each country, so that the foreign investor faces competition
from two producers in A and one producer in B would not change the qualitative results
of the model.
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to be prohibitively high, so that access to regional consumers requires an in-
vestment.6 The investment cost is assumed to be the same in both countries.
The multinational produces a good identical to that of firm a. We simplify
by assuming that the marginal production costs, denoted by c, are the same
for the local and the foreign producer. Exports involve a per unit trade cost
t. After entry, there is Cournot competition between the two firms. If the
foreign firm, which we shall denote by f , invests in country A and exports
to B, the operating profits of both firms are given by
πAf = πAa =
α (1− c)2
9
+
(1− c− t)2
9
, (3)
where the first term is profits in market A and the second term profits in
B. Similarly, if firm f invests in B its operating profits are
πBf =
α (1− c− 2t)2
9
+
(1− c+ t)2
9
, (4)
while those of firm a are:
πBa =
α (1− c+ t)2
9
+
(1− c− 2t)2
9
. (5)
Note that the trade costs t perform an important function. They separate
the two markets, so that the location decision has real implications. If trade
costs were zero, the location decision within the region would have no impact
on profits: πAf = πAa = πBf = πBa .
A country’s welfare consists of consumer surplus, and, for country A, the
producer surplus of firm a. In addition, we open up for the possibility of the
wage rate exceeding the shadow price of labor. In this case, domestic welfare
also includes the workers’ surplus from being employed. If the investment
takes place in A, the consumer surplus in A is:
σAA =
α (2− 2c)2
18
, (6)
6The reason for this assumption is simply that the trade versus investment choice is
well understood from the literature on foreign direct investment, and that it is not the
focus of our analysis. See, however, Fumagalli (2003) for an analysis that includes exports
as a mode of servicing a foreign market.
6
while the consumer surplus in B in this case is given by:
σAB =
(2− 2 (c+ t))2
18
. (7)
If the investment takes place in B, consumer surplus in A is:
σBA =
α (2− 2c− t)2
18
, (8)
and in B:
σBB =
(2− 2c− t)2
18
. (9)
The equations show the well known influences on the consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus rises when the size of the market rises (α) or when marginal
cost components (c and t) fall.
In order to analyse the job-creation motive for FDI, we wish to allow for
the possibility of involuntary unemployment in our model. Let the shadow
price of labor be given by γ and assume that c ≥ γ. If c > γ, there is a surplus
from being employed which is given by the diﬀerence (c− γ) per employed
worker. As in Barros and Cabral (2000), labor is the only variable factor of
production and production of one unit of output requires one unit of labor.
Employment is then equal to output, and c can be interpreted as the wage
rate. With these assumptions, calculating the worker surplus in a country,
defined by l, is straightforward. When the investment takes place in country
A, the worker surplus in country A is given by lAA = (c− γ) (QA +QB):
lAA = (c− γ)
·
2αc (1− c)
3
+
2c (1− c− t)
3
¸
. (10)
Naturally, when both firms produce in country A, there is no production
in country B. Hence, there is no worker surplus in B, and lAB = 0. When the
firm invests in B, the worker surplus in B is
lBB = (c− γ)
·
αc (1− c− 2t)
3
+
c (1− c+ t)
3
¸
, (11)
where the first term in the square brackets represents firm f ’s produc-
tion for market A and the second term firm f ’s production for market B.
Similarly, when the firm invests in B the worker surplus in A is:
lBA = (c− γ)
·
αc (1− c+ t)
3
+
c (1− c− 2t)
3
¸
, (12)
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where the first term in the square brackets represents firm a’s production
for market A and the second term firm a’s production for market B. We can
now determine the welfare (W ) of each country. Welfare consists of consumer
and worker surplus plus local profits (in A). Investment subsidies or taxes
are not included, but we will deal with them later. If the foreign firm invests
in A, country A welfare, excluding any investment subsidies or taxes, is given
by:
WAA = πAa + σAA + lAA, (13)
and country B welfare by:
WAB = σAB. (14)
If the investment is located in country B, country B welfare is given by:
WBB = σBB + lBB , (15)
and country A welfare by
WBA = πBa + σBA + lBA . (16)
Note that without unemployment, c = γ and hence lAA = lBA = lBB = 0. In
this case, regional welfare would consist of only consumer surplus and, for
country A, firm a profits.
In the following we will simplify notation by assuming that the shadow
price of labor is zero, γ = 0. In this way, c captures both the absolute wage
rate and the diﬀerence between the wage rate and the shadow price of labor.
It is useful to procede by first considering the investment choice with exoge-
nous government policy as a benchmark. We then move on to endogenising
the investment policies, and consider the impact of policy competition on
aggregate welfare.
2.1 Investment location with exogenous policy
For simplicity, in the analysis of investment location with exogenous policy
we assume that the two countries have identical policies. In this way, policy
does not aﬀect the investor’s location choice. The investor compares πAf
and πBf . The critical level of trade costs for which the investor is indiﬀerent
between investing in A and B, i.e. where πAf = πBf , can be found from (3)
and (4) as:
8
t∗ =
(1− c) (α− 1)
α . (17)
Proposition 1 With identical policies, there exists a critical t∗ so that πAf =
πBf . If t < t∗, πAf > πBf , and the firm chooses to invests in A. If t > t∗,
πAf < πBf , and the firm invests in B.
Proof. Evaluated at t = t∗,
∂(πAf −πBf )
∂t = −
4
9
(1− c) (α− 1) < 0.
Intuitively, the location decision in the absence of policy competition is
determined as a trade-oﬀ between the “market size” eﬀect, i.e. the advantages
of locating in the larger market A, and the “competition” eﬀect, i.e. the
benefits of being the single producer in B, and hence operating in a less
competitive environment. The higher are trade costs, the more protected are
national markets from international competition, and the more important
is the competition argument in favor of location in B. Higher marginal
production costs c reduce the relative importance of market size, and hence
is also an argument in favor of locating in B.
2.2 Investment location and welfare with endogenous
policy
Investment policies are determined by welfare maximizing governments. Any
fiscal incentive oﬀered by a country’s government to a potential investor must
reflect the country’s benefits of the investment. Thus, in order to determine
equilibrium policies, it is useful to define the net benefits a country derives
from hosting the investment:
Definition 1 Country A’s net benefit from hosting the foreign firm is defined
as wA ≡ WAA − WBA . Similarly, country B’s net benefit from hosting the
foreign firm is defined as wB ≡WBB −WAB .
Naturally, wA and wB describe the maximal fiscal incentives that the
respective governments would be willing to oﬀer. Clearly, wB = σBB − σAB +
lBB > 0. This is due to the fact that there are no local firms in country
B so that the impact of an investment on consumer and worker surplus is
unambiguously positive. Consequently, country B is always willing to pay a
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subsidy to attract the foreign investor. This is diﬀerent for country A. We
find that wA = 0 for
t1 =
4 (1− c)
3 (α+ 2) . (18)
Evaluated at t = t1, ∂wA∂t =
1
9
(2 (c− 1)− 3αc) < 0. Hence, for t < t1,
countryA benefits from hosting the investment and would therefore be willing
to oﬀer a subsidy to attract the foreign investor. For t > t1, A would require
a tax to host the foreign firm.
If trade costs are low, the two markets are only weakly separated, so that
the multinational’s location decision has little impact on firm a’s profits. In
this case, the concern for consumer surplus and employment outweighs the
concern for local profits in A. But if trade costs are high, local firms profit
from keeping the multinational at a distance, so that local governments start
taxing foreign entry.
The equilibrium policy is determined by an auction where the country
making the most attractive oﬀer gets the investment. When comparing the
two countries, the investor considers both what the locations oﬀer in terms of
profits from sales and what the local government oﬀers in terms of investment
incentives. Similarly, a country that wishes to attract the investment must
consider what the investor would earn by investing in the other country,
including the incentives oﬀered by that country.
To determine the equilibrium of the policy contest, we first determine
the bid that a country needs to make to out-bid the rival government. The
investment goes to the country that is actually willing to make this bid. Con-
sider for instance country B. In order to be certain to attract the foreign
investment, the government in B needs to look at what firm f could alterna-
tively make by investing in A. This includes the investor’s profits from sales
when located in A, given by πAf . Moreover, it includes an investment subsidy
or tax. For B to out-bid A, it needs to consider the most generous oﬀer by
A, given by wA. The investor’s profit by investing in A, including the best
oﬀer by the government of A, is then given by:
πmaxA = πAf + wA. (19)
The minimum subsidy that B must oﬀer to attract the investment can
therefore be expressed as:
sminB = πmaxA − πBf . (20)
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Whether or not country B is willing to make this oﬀer, depends on B’s
willingness to pay, given by wB. If wB > sminB , then clearly B has an in-
centive to out-bid A in the competition for f . Since the highest bidder gets
the investment, country B gets the investment for wB > sminB , oﬀering an
investment subsidy given by sminB . Similarly, the investor’s profit by investing
in B, including the best oﬀer by the government of B, is given by:
πmaxB = πBf + wB. (21)
The minimum subsidy A must oﬀer to attract the investment is given by
sminA = πmaxB − πAf . (22)
Whether or not country A would be willing to oﬀer sminA depends on wA.
If wA > sminA , firm A is able and willing to out-bid B. In this case, the firm
would invest in A and be oﬀered a policy sminA . If wA < s
min
A , the firm would
invest in B. Note that7:
sminA − wA = wB − sminB . (23)
Hence, sminA > wA implies s
min
B < wB, and vice versa. The condition
wA = s
min
A (or equivalently wB = s
min
B ) can be expressed as:
t∗∗ =
(8− 2c) (α− 1)
3 + 11α . (24)
Proposition 2 With endogenous policy, for t > t∗∗, wB > sminB , and the
firm invests in B. For t < t∗∗, wA > sminA , and the firm invests in A.
Proof. Evaluated at t = t∗∗,
∂(sminA −wA)
∂t =
1
9
(4− c) (α− 1) > 0.
As in the case with exogenous policy, we see from (24) that the larger
is country A relative to B, the more likely it is that the firm invests in A.
Higher trade costs and higher marginal production costs are arguments in
favor of investing in B. Clearly, t∗ and t∗∗ are not identical per se. Hence,
it is clear that policy competition may aﬀect the multinational’s location
decision.
7To see this, observe that inserting (21) in (22) results in sminA = πBf + wB − πAf .
Similarly, from (19) and (20) we find that sminB = πAf + wA − πBf . Hence, sminB − wA =
πAf − πBf = wB − sminA , which in turn can be expressed as (23).
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2.3 Policy competition and aggregate welfare
Since policy competition may aﬀect the location decision of the investor, it
may also aﬀect aggregate welfare, or eﬃciency, defined as the sum of the two
countries’ welfare and the investor’s profits. We can demonstrate that:
Proposition 3 The investment decision with policy competition maximizes
aggregate welfare.
Proof. Define Ω ≡ wA−wB + πAf − πBf , which can be interpreted as the
aggregate welfare gain of locating in A over B. Using (21) and (22), we get:
wA − sminA = Ω.
If wA < sminA , then policy competition leads to an investment in B. Clearly,
wA < s
min
A implies that Ω < 0, so that locating in B is also the optimal deci-
sion from an aggregate welfare perspective. Similarly, wA > sminA implies that
Ω > 0, and the investment takes place in the welfare maximizing location,
A. If t = t∗∗, Ω = 0.
Hence, from an aggregate perspective, policy competition leads to an eﬃ-
cient outcome.8 However, eﬃciency is only half the story. Policy competition
creates winners and losers. For instance, if policy competition is intense, the
equilibrium investment subsidy may be such that the region as a whole loses
from policy competition, even if this competition leads to an increase in ag-
gregate welfare. We will return to distributional eﬀects of policy competition
later in the analysis.
There are two arguments in favor of attracting FDI in our model, in-
creased consumer surplus and job creation. We start out our analysis by
focussing only on the former argument. To do this we assume that there
is no involuntary unemployment in the region. The wage level then reflects
the shadow price of labor (c = γ = 0). In Case 2 we allow for a minimum
wage c > γ = 0. In this case, the labor costs that firms face exceed the true
labor costs for society. For this reason, there is too little employment in the
economy, and hence a role for FDI as a means of job-creation.
8The observation that policy competition may lead to an increase in aggregate welfare
has been made also by Barros and Cabral (2000) and Fumagalli (2003).
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3 Case 1. Full employment
We start the discussion of the full employment case by first analysing the
issue of location, then the degree of policy competition, and finally welfare.
3.1 Location
We see from (17) and (24) that for α > 1 and c = 0, t∗ > t∗∗. Figure 1
illustrates the location decision of the production firm with exogenous and
endogenous policies. The vertical axis is bounded above by t = 0.5 to secure
positive quantities in equilibrium.
1 1.5 2
α
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
t
t*
t**
Figure 1: Location
Above the t∗-curve the location decision is B without policy intervention,
and below the t∗-curve, the firm invests in A. Above the t∗∗-curve, the
equilibrium location with endogenous policy is in B, and below the t∗∗-curve,
in A. Hence:
Proposition 4 Without unemployment, policy competition increases the at-
tractiveness of country B as location for investment.
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Intuitively, the reason why policy competition makes B relatively more
attractive, is that B has the higher willingness to pay for the investment;
wB > wA. In addition to local consumer interests, the government of A also
takes into consideration the profit-shifting eﬀect of foreign entry away from
the local firm. The profit loss of firm a reduces the gains from hosting the
investment, and hence reduces the investment incentives that A would be
willing to oﬀer. Country B has no relevant local competitor to consider, a
fact which raises its willingness to pay for the investment relative to that of
country A. When the location advantage of A in the case with symmetric
investment policy is positive but fairly weak, i.e. just below the t∗-curve,
opening up for policy competition changes the equilibrium location choice of
the investor from A to B.
3.2 Intensity of policy competition
We are interested not only in the location outcome but also in the intensity of
policy competition. When will policy competition result in a net transfer of
money from the host country government to the investor, i.e. a subsidy, and
when will there be a transfer of money from the investor to the host country
government, i.e. a tax? The direction of the money flow is an indication
of the bargaining position of the host government relative to the investor.
Define the critical level of t for which sminB = 0 as:
t2 =
8α− 4
6 + 11α . (25)
At t = t2,
∂sminB
∂t =
2
9
(1− 2α) < 0. Thus, for t > t2, sminB < 0, and the
investor has to pay an investment tax to country B if it chooses to invest
there. For t < t2, sminB > 0, and the investor receives an investment subsidy
if it chooses to invest in B. The critical level of t for which sminA = 0 can be
found as:
t3 =
8α− 12
8α− 3 . (26)
At t = t3,
∂sminA
∂t =
4
9
¡
α− 3
2
¢
> 0 for α > 3
2
. Hence, for t > t3 > 0,
sminA > 0, and the investor receives a subsidy if it invests in A. If 0 < t < t3,
sminA < 0, and the investor pays an investment tax if it chooses to locate
in A. Figure 2 extends Figure 1 by adding the critical trade costs t2, and
t3. For the welfare analysis, we also include two dashed lines, t1 defined in
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(18) and t0, to be defined later. The letters in the figure indicate the host
country of the investment, with the subscripts indicating the equilibrium
policy. For instance, AS means that the foreign firm invests in country A,
and that A oﬀers an investment subsidy, whereas AT implies that A charges
an investment tax.
1 1.5 2
α
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
t
AS
BS
BTBT
BS
t*
t3
t**
AT
t2
II
I
III
IV
V
VI
t1
t0
Figure 2: Policy
Area I in Figure 2 describes a situation where country A gets the in-
vestment with and without policy competition (since t < t∗∗ < t∗). The
equilibrium policy is given by a subsidy to the investor (t > t3). Area II is
similar to area I, except now A charges an investment tax. The bargaining
position of A is now fairly strong, since the large market size in A provides a
strong location advantage for this country. In Area III, the investment goes
to country B with and without policy competition (t > t∗ > t∗∗). Country
B oﬀers an investment subsidy (t < t2). In Areas IV and V, characterized by
t∗∗ < t < t∗, policy competition changes the location decision of the investor
from A to B. In IV, where t∗∗ < t < min (t∗, t2), country B pays a subsidy
to attract the investor. In V (t2 < t < t∗), its bargaining position is stronger
since A is less eager to attract the investment, and B charges an investment
tax. Finally, Area VI describes a situation where the foreign firm invests in B
with and without endogenous policy (t > t∗∗) and B charges an investment
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tax (t > t2). To sum up:
Proposition 5 Policy competition is more intense (in the sense that the
equilibrium policy is characterized by an investment subsidy rather than an
investment tax) when the countries oﬀer relatively similar location advan-
tages.
Trade costs constitute a location argument in favor of B, since locating
there reduces intra-regional competition. A large market size in A is a loca-
tion argument in favor of locating in A. When these arguments are relatively
“balanced”, the equilibrium policy will be a subsidy. In Figure 2, this is the
case in areas I, III, and IV. When there are strong market based arguments
in favor of investing in one country, competition for the investment will be
less fierce. In this case, a country can tax the investment and still be the
more attractive location for investment. This is true in Areas II, V, VI.9
3.3 Welfare
We have already seen that policy competition leads to a solution where aggre-
gate welfare is maximized. We could thus conclude that policy competition
for FDI is good. But policy competition for FDI creates winners and losers,
and from a welfare perspective, we are interested not only in eﬃciency but
also in distribution. Clearly, when there is subsidy competition and no eﬀect
on the location decision of the investor, policy competition has no impact on
eﬃciency. The only impact is a transfer of funds from the host country to
the investing firm. This is true in areas I and III in Figure 2.
More interesting is the case when policy competition in fact alters the
location choice of the investor. We know that aggregate welfare in this case
increases. We also know that the county that manages to attract the in-
vestment through fiscal incentives, namely country B, necessarily gains from
policy competition. Country A, of course, loses. Since we know that aggre-
gate welfare increases, if we allowed for side payments, firm f and country
B could compensate country A such that all parties would gain from the
relocation of the investment.
9The result that strong location advantages increase the bargaining power of potential
host countries and may lead to taxation of FDI rather than subsidies, is also found in
Haufler and Wooton (1999).
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It is interesting to investigate the eﬀect of policy competition on regional
welfare. Is the gain to country B, net of the investment subsidy it pays
to the investor, larger than the loss to country A? If the region as a whole
gains, then country B would be able to compensate country A and all parties
would gain from the relocation, even in the absence of side-payments from
firm f . We measure gains and losses relative to a situation with no investment
subsidies or taxes. The net gain to country B from hosting the investment,
net of the investment subsidy it pays to firm f , is given by wB − sminB . The
loss to country A from not hosting the investment is given by wA. Hence, for
the region as a whole, the net gain is given by wB − sminB − wA. The critical
level of trade costs for which wB − sminB − wA = 0 is given by:
t0 =
8α− 4
14α+ 9 . (27)
At t = t0,
∂(wB−sminB −wA)
∂t =
2
9
(2α− 1) > 0. Thus, for t < t0, i.e., in the
lower half of area IV in Figure 2, wB−sminB −wA < 0, and the region as a whole
loses from policy competition relative to a situation with no investment taxes
or subsidies even when aggregate welfare increases. This is an area where
subsidy competition is intense, and hence the subsidy sminB is substantial. At
the same time trade costs between countries are low, so that the two markets
are only weakly separated, and the gains from inducing the MNE to invest in
market B are only small (wB −wA is low). In this case, the region would be
better oﬀ without policy competition even if this would lead to the “wrong”
location decision from an aggregate welfare perspective. For t0 < t < t2
in area IV, however, the region gains even though the host country oﬀers a
subsidy to the investor. In this area, the two markets are strongly separated
and a change in location has large impacts on welfare (wB − wA is large),
while the subsidy sminB is smaller.
10 Hence, we can conclude that:
Proposition 6 Policy competition increases regional welfare given that it
leads to a reallocation of the investment and that policy competition is not
too intense.
Finally, let us consider the welfare implications of policy competition
for country A. Again, we are interested in the parameter space for which
policy competition aﬀects the location decision of the investor. With zero
10Note that sminB approaches zero as t approaches t2.
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investment subsidy and taxes as reference point, we can show that country
A not necessarily loses from policy competition even though it loses the
investment. Policy competition would then increase both countries’ welfare.
More precisely, we can demonstrate that:
Proposition 7 Policy competition may increase both countries’ welfare given
that it leads to a reallocation of the investment and that both the trade cost
and the diﬀerence in market size are suﬃciently large.
The reason why country A may gain from not hosting the investment is
that when the market size of A is relatively large, the gain in local producer
surplus dominates the loss in local consumer surplus. This is true for t > t1,
for which wA < 0.
4 Case 2. Unemployment
Assume now that c > γ = 0, so that there is a discrepancy between the wage
rate c and the shadow price of labor in the region, γ. The introduction of a
positive minimum wage brings along two major changes. First of all, firms
now have to pay a positive marginal production cost in addition to trade
costs. And second, local governments care about employment in addition to
consumer and producer surplus. The first change aﬀects the MNE’s location
decision independent of investment policies. The second change aﬀects the
size of local subsidies oﬀered.
We see from (17) that a higher minimum wage reduces t∗. Hence, the
higher is the minimum wage, the stronger is the incentive for the investor to
locate in B. Intuitively, higher marginal production costs reduces the relative
importance of market size. Second, we see that t∗∗ defined in (24) also falls
in c. Hence, the higher is the minimum wage, the more likely is the foreign
firm to invest in B also with policy competition.
Proposition 8 A minimum wage increases the attractiveness of country B
as location for the investment, both with and without policy competition.
More interestingly, perhaps, we find that ∂(t
∗−t∗∗)
∂c < 0 for all α > 1.
This means that while an increase in c makes B the preferred investment
location for a broader range of trade costs and diﬀerences in country size,
the parameter space for which policy competition leads to a relocation of
18
1 1.5 2
α
0
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
0.2
t
t*
t**
AS
I
AS
IIBS
III
Figure 3: Unemployment: High minimum wage
investment from A to B diminishes. In fact, at c = α+1
3α+1 ∈
£
1
3
, 1
2
¤
, t∗ = t∗∗,
and the introduction of fiscal incentives has no impact on the location of the
investment for any t or α. If c > α+1
3α+1 , then t
∗ < t∗∗, and policy competition
actually leads to a switch from B to A in the range of t ∈ (t∗, t∗∗). We can
summarize this discussion as follows:
Proposition 9 If the minimum wage is suﬃciently high, policy competition
may lead to a relocation of investment from B to A.
Intuitively, an increase in the minimum wage strengthens the job creation
argument in favor of FDI. Since A is the larger country, the number of jobs
created there and hence its willingness to pay for job creation is larger than
that of the smaller country B.11 Put diﬀerently, when c is high, the job
creation eﬀect dominates the profit shifting eﬀect of FDI in country A, thus
inducing A to subsidize FDI. Figure 3 illustrates the unemployment case with
a relatively high minimum wage (c = 0.6). Trade costs are bounded above
by t = 0.2, such that quantities in equilibrium are always positive.
11It is straightforward to demonstrate that lAA −
¡
lBB + l
B
A
¢
= tc3 (α− 1), implying that
the employment eﬀect is greater when the investment takes place in the larger country A.
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In area II, policy competition leads to a relocation of investment from
country B to A. Following Proposition 3, we know that this relocation im-
proves aggregate welfare. However, it is possible to show that for all parame-
ter values covered in Figure 3, the region loses from the policy competition
relative to a situation without subsidies. This is trivially true in areas I and
III where the region oﬀers a subsidy without aﬀecting the equilibrium loca-
tion decision. More interestingly, it also holds in area II, where the relocation
creates potential welfare benefits: The gain to country A net of investment
incentive to firm f is dominated by the loss to country B. In contrast to
the case with full employment, it is never the case that the country that
loses the policy competition for FDI, in the present scenario country B for
t∗ < t < t∗∗, will gain in terms of welfare. Hence, there is clearly a conflict
between the two countries in area II on the issue of policy competition for
FDI, country A being in favor and B opposing it.
5 Conclusion
We have analysed policy competition for FDI between two asymmetric coun-
tries in a region, one country being larger and than the other, and also hous-
ing a local firm. Policy competition is more fierce when the countries oﬀer
equally strong location advantages. The location advantage for the smaller
country, B, is high trade costs and for country, A, a larger market size. With-
out unemployment, policy competition strengthens the relative profitability
of investing in B over A, and may thus cause a switch in the investment
decision from A to B. With unemployment, and for a high minimum wage,
policy competition may have the reverse eﬀect, causing a relocation of invest-
ment from B to A. In any case, a change in the investment decision due to
policy competition improves aggregate welfare. We have also shown that in
the absence of policy coordination between the two countries in the region,
if policy competition is intense, regional welfare goes down even when policy
competition leads to a reallocation of investment and hence an increase in
aggregate welfare. Moreover, we have demonstrated that there may, or may
not, be a conflict of interest between the two countries. In fact, since country
A also has to take into account local producer interests, it may be in country
A’s best interest to let the investment go to B.
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